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Based on the novel idea of twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD, by M. Lucamarini ,Z.L.
Yuan, J.F. Dynes, & A.J. Shields, Nature 557, pages 400-403 (2018)), we present a protocol named
as “sending or not sending TF-QKD” protocol which can tolerate large misalignment error. The
revolutionary theoretical breakthrough in quantum communication, TF-QKD, changes the channel-
loss dependence of the key rate from linear to square root. However, it demands the challenging
technology of long distance single-photon interference, and also, as stated in the original paper,
the security proof was not finalized there due to the possible effects of the afterwards announced
phase information. Here we show by a concrete Eavesdropping scheme that the afterwards phase
announcement do have important effects and the traditional formulas of decoy-state method does
not apply to the original protocol. We then present our “sending or not sending” protocol. Our
protocol does not take post selection for the bits in Z basis (signal pulses) and hence the traditional
decoy-state method directly apply therefore automatically resolves the issue of security proof. Most
importantly, our protocol presents a negligibly small error rate in Z-basis because it does not request
any single-photon interference in this basis. This makes our protocol greatly improve the tolerable
threshold of misalignment error in single-photon interference from the original a few percent to more
than 45%. As shown numerically, our protocol exceeds a secure distance of 700 km, 600 km, 500
km, or 300 km even though the single-photon interference misalignment error rate is as large as
15%, 25%, 35%, or 45%.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] can in princi-
ple present secure private communications with its secu-
rity guaranteed by principles of quantum physics. With
the development [3–15] in both theory and experiment,
it is more and more hoped to be extensively applied in
practice, though there are barriers for so. Among all bar-
riers, channel loss of long distance QKD is the major one
[10, 12].
Very recently, a revolutionary theoretical progress was
made by Lucamarini et al. They proposed the novel idea
of twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) [14]
which has historically changed the relationship between
key rate and the channel loss from linearly dependent
to square root dependent. Consequently, the TF-QKD
makes a great breakthrough of a secure distance longer
than 500 km.
In the twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-
QKD)[14], Alice and Bob send fields to the un-trusted
third party Charlie. In an virtual ideal protocol, Alice
and Bob initially share single-photon entangled states of
∗Email Address: xbwang@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
|Φ0〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉). They each will take a phase shift
of either 0 or π to each one’s local field and they will
send their fields to Charlie. After a collective measure-
ment, Charlie will see whether the bipartite is |Φ0〉 or
|Φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). Except Alice and Bob, no one
knows which value, 0 or π was selected by Alice or Bob in
doing their phase shift, although it is known to everyone
whether Alice and Bob has used the same phase shift or
different phase shift. So, they can use the information
whether Alice has taken a phase shift 0 or π for their
secret key.
However, in practice, we do not have such an initially
shared states. The TF-QKD proposed to use weak coher-
ent states at each side. As was stated in the original arti-
cle [14], the security is not finally completed because the
possible effects of afterwards announcement of the phase
information are not taken into consideration. As shown
by a concrete Eavesdropping scheme in the supplement,
we find that the phase information announced afterwards
makes the traditional formulas of the decoy state method
[5–7] do not apply to the original protocol [14]. In fact
given the scheme in the appendix, Eve can have full in-
formation to the key bits while traditional decoy-state
method can give a key rate of 50%. Our Eavesdrop-
ping scheme shows that the fraction of single-photon bits
among all raw bits must be not less than 50%, otherwise
2Eve may have full information to all bits without caus-
ing any disturbance. Although one may naturally turn
to the key rate formulas for non-random-phase coherent
states to resolve the issue, however, TF-QKD relied on
the challenging technology of long distance single-photon
interference, which may produce large misalignment er-
ror. Here we construct a “ sending or not sending ”
TF-QKD protocol where there is no phase-slice depen-
dent post selection for signal bits. Not only this itself
increases the amount of key bits, but also, this makes
the traditional calculation formulas for the decoy state
method directly apply, the security proof is automati-
cally completed and the less efficient key rate formula for
non-phase-random coherent states is not necessary. Most
importantly, our protocol can tolerate large misalignment
error rate due to the long distance single-photon inter-
ference.
II. SENDING OR NOT-SENDING (SNS)
PROTOCOL
Step 0. At any time window i, as requested by the
TF-QKD, they (Alice and Bob) take random phase shifts
δAi, δBi to their coherent states accompanied by the ref-
erence light which is sent to Charlie. Charlie is also sup-
posed to do appropriate phase compensation, but he is
possibly dishonest.
Step 1. At any time window i, Alice (Bob) indepen-
dently determines whether it is a decoy window or a sig-
nal window. If it is a decoy window, she (he) sends out
to Charlie a decoy pulse in coherent state |√µeiδAi+iγAi〉
(|√µeiδBi+iγBi〉 ); and µ can randomly change among a
few different values at different decoy-windows. If it is
a signal window, she (he) decides to send out to Charlie
a signal pulse |√µ′eiδAi+iγAi〉 (|√µ′eiδBi+iγBi〉 ) by prob-
ability ǫ and she (he) decides not to send out anything
by probability 1 − ǫ. Given whatever window she (he)
commits, and whatever decision she (he) makes, the ran-
dom phase-shift values of δAi (δBi) are taken privately
by Alice and Bob, respectively. Given whatever window
she (he) commits, and whatever decision she (he) makes,
the global phases γAi (γBi) are always announced, e.g.,
by a strong reference light.
Note: This sending by small probability ǫ or not sending
by probability 1− ǫ is the heart of our protocol.
Note: A coherent state of intensity x and global phase γ
is a linear superposition of photon number states {|k〉}
of |√xeiγ〉 =∑∞k=0 e
−x/2(
√
xeiγ)k√
k!
|k〉. In a signal window,
if Alice or Bob decides to send, she (he) shall always
send a coherent state of intensity µ′. For example, at
a certain time when they both determined signal win-
dows, if Alice decides to send while Bob decides not
to send, the two-mode state from this time window is
|√µ′eiδA+iγA〉 ⊗ |0〉; if both of them decide to send, the
two-mode state is |√µ′eiδA+iγA〉⊗ |√µ′eiδB+iγB 〉; if both
of them decide not to send, the state at that time win-
dow is |00〉. Here γA, γB are global phases of the coherent
states. They are known to Eve because Alice and Bob
also send strong reference pulses accompany the weak
coherent light. States from a decoy window can have dif-
ferent intensities. If at a certain time both of them have
chosen decoy window and both of them have happened to
choose the same intensity µ, the two-mode coherent state
from this time window is |√µeiδA+iγA〉 ⊗ |√µeiδB+iγB 〉.
In the protocol, Charlie is supposed to do phase com-
pensation, trying to remove the global phases. If Charlie
does this perfectly, the states from each side after the
compensation have the same global phases. For exam-
ple, state |√µeiδA+iγA〉 ⊗ |√µeiδB+iγB 〉 will be changed
into |√µeiδA+iγA〉 ⊗ |√µeiδB+iγB 〉 after a perfect phase
compensation by Charlie.
Step 2. Charlie is supposed to measure all twin-fields
with a beam-splitter after taking phase compensation
and announce the measurement outcome.
Note: We define an effective event by the following crite-
rion: (i) If Charlie announces only one detector counting
corresponding to a time window i when both of them
have determined a signal window, it is an effective event;
(ii) if Charlie announces only one detector counting cor-
responding to a time window i when both of them have
determined a decoy window, used the same intensity of
coherent states, and in that time window, the pre-chosen
values δA, δB satisfy
1− | cos(δA − δB)| ≤ |λ|. (1)
Here the value λ is determined by the size of phase
slice[14] chosen by Alice and Bob. Whenever an effec-
tive event happens, a bit in the corresponding basis is
recorded.
Step 3. They announce each one’s decoy windows and
signal windows. They also announce details for intensi-
ties of pulses sent from decoy windows and values δA, δB
they each have used.
Note: We define a Z-window as a time window when both
Alice and Bob have determined a signal window. We
name states from such Z-windows as states in Z-basis, or
simply Z-pairs, Z-states. Effective events happen in Z-
basis are named as Z-bits. Given that δA value (δB value)
is randomized, whenever Alice or Bob sends a coherent
state of intensity µ′, it can be equivalently regarded as a
density matrix of
∫ 2pi
0
|√µ′eiδA+iγA〉〈√µ′eiδA+iγA |dδA =∑∞
k=0
e−µ
′
µ′
k
k! |k〉〈k|, which is a classical mixture of differ-
ent photon number states only. Hence we can define Z1-
windows as a subset of Z-windows when only one party
of Alice and Bob decides to send and she (he) actually
sends a single-photon state. In a Z1-window, the two-
mode single photon state sent out is either |z0〉 = |01〉
or |z1〉 = |10〉. We shall call them as Z1 states or
Z1 pairs. Also, effective events caused in Z1-windows
are named as Z1-bits. Furthermore, we define an X-
window as a time window when 1) both of them have
chosen the decoy window, 2) both of them have cho-
sen the same intensity for the coherent state to send,
3and 3) the random phase δA, δB chosen for the window
satisfy Eq.(1). We name the two-mode states from X-
windows as states in X-basis, or simply X-pairs or X-
states, and an X-bit is a bit caused by X pair. Also,
as shown later, states of X pairs can be regarded as a
probabilistic mixture of different photon-number states,
with the two-mode single-photon ingredient |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, and
|ψ1〉 = 1√2 (ei(δB+γB)|01〉 + ei(δA+γA)|10〉). Therefore we
can define an X1-window as anX-window when they send
a (two-mode) single-photon state. We also name those
states from X1-windows as X1-pairs or X1-states, and the
bits caused X1 pairs as X1-bits. They do not know which
time windows are Z1-windows and X1-windows, neither
do they know which bits are Z1-bits and X1-bits, though
they can know the number of these windows and bits
by calculation. If we only consider Z1-windows and X1-
windows, the states set here is similar to that in a BB84
protocol[1].
Step 4. They randomly choose some Z-bits to do error
test. By this they can know the bit-error rate in Z-basis,
EZ . They discard the test bits and the remaining Z-bits
will be distilled for the final key.
Note: For any effective event happens in Z-basis, Alice
(Bob) judges the bit value in this way: if she (he) has
decided to send out a signal pulse, she (he) denotes a
bit value 1 (0); if she (he) has decided not to send, she
denotes a bit value 0 (1). One can see straightly, if an
effective event happens while both Alice and Bob have
decided not to send, or both of them have decided to
send, a wrong bit in Z-basis is created. Because in such
a case, the bit value denoted by Alice is different from
the bit value denoted by Bob.
Step 5. They use the announced data from X pairs
to calculate the counting rate (yield) s1 for X1-windows
(which is also the value for Z1-windows). The number
of bits created in Z1-windows can be directly calculated
from this value. Also, by observing error rate of X pairs
of intensity µ, EXµ , the counting rate of intensity µ, Sµ,
and the counting rate of vacuum s0, they can calculate
the upper bound value of flipping rate of X1-bits by
eX11 =
SµE
X
µ − e−2µs0/2
2µe−2µs1
. (2)
Asymptotically, the phase-flip rate eph1 for Z1 bits is
eph1 = e
X1
1 .
Note: In the protocol, Charlie does the beam-splitter
measurement[14] after he takes the phase compensation.
There are two output ports of the beam-splitter: right de-
tector and left detector. They use the following criterion
to judge a right bit or a wrong bit in X-basis: A right X-
bit is the left (right) detector clicking caused by anX-pair
with positive (negative) value of cos(δA − δB). A wrong
X-bit is the right (left) detector clicking caused by a X-
pair with positive (negative) value of cos(δA−δB). Given
the observed error rate in X-basis and s1, the phase-flip
error rate eph1 for Z1-bits can be obtained because asymp-
totically it is just the error rate of those single-photon-
caused X-bits, as shown in the supplement. Note that,
although they know the number of X1-bits, they don’t
know which ones are X1-bits and hence quantity eX11 can-
not be directly observed, it can be only calculated by the
formula above.
Note: Also, as one can easily see, if Charlie does the
phase compensation perfectly, the out of beam-splitter
measurement[14] will produce a small observed error rate
in X-basis, if |λ| is small in the post-selection criterion
Eq.(1). Charlie does not have to be honest or do the
compensation perfectly. But this will only change the
observed error rate in X-basis rather than the security
of the protocol.
Step 6. They distill the final key with an asymptotic
key rate formula
Nf = n1 − n1H(eph1 )− ntfH(EZ) (3)
Nf : number of final bits, n1: number of remaining Z1-
bits after error test in Step 4; nt: number of remaining
Z-bits after error test in step 4, H(x) = −x log x − (1 −
x) log(1− x): binary entropy function, and f : error cor-
rection efficiency factor. The formula can be equivalently
written in the following form of key rate per time window:
R = 2ǫ(1− ǫ)
µ′e−µ
′
s1
(
1−H(eph1 )
)
− SZfH(EZ) (4)
where SZ is the observed counting rate of Z-windows.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In our protocol, we use the traditional formulas
for the decoy-state method. Since we don’t need any
post selection in Z basis and we only need sending
or not-sending, there is no misalignment error in this
basis. This makes the protocol be able to work with
large misalignment from the single-photon interference
in X basis. The results of numerical simulation are
summarized in Fig.1 and Fig.2. In the calculation, we
have assumed a detector with dark count rate of 10−11,
and the detection efficiency of 80%. An error correction
coefficient of 1.1 is set in our calculation. Here, we have
only considered the asymptotic result and we have set
the phase slice infinitely small. We can do so because
in our case we take no post selection in Z basis. And,
at each data, point, we have optimized ǫ and the signal
pulse intensity so as to obtain the best key rate. We can
see that our protocol is so robust to misalignment errors
that it can exceed a secure distance of nearly 300 km
even with the misalignment error rate of 45%. It exceeds
a secure distance of 700 km or 600 km even though the
single-photon misalignment error rate is as large as 15%
or 25%. Also, fixed at the distance to be 500 km, the
key rates are shown with different misalignment errors.
The largest tolerable error rate can be 35%. These
results show that our protocol by far breaks the existing
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FIG. 1: Log scale of the key rate as a function of the dis-
tance between Alice and Bob with different misalignment er-
rors. ea: misalignment error rate of single-photon interfer-
ence. MDIQKD: The optimized key rate for existing decoy-
state MDI-QKD with coherent states. In calculating MDI-
QKD, we take misalignment error rate 1.5% for X-basis and
0 for Z-basis. The numerical result here shows that asymp-
totically our protocol can have an obvious advantage to the
existing decoy-state MDI-QKD even the misalignment error
is as large as 35%.
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FIG. 2: Log scale of the key rate as a function of the mis-
alignment error when the distance between Alice and Bob is
500 km.
a-few-percent threshold of single-photon misalignment
error rate of for a larger-than-0 secure distance. When
there is no misalignment error, our protocol exceeds a
secure distance of more than 800 km.
IV. VALIDITY OF THE DECOY-STATE
METHOD
Specifically, in the protocol Alice takes a random phase
shift δA to her coherent state and Bob takes a random
phase shift δB to his coherent state. The two-mode
weak coherent state prepared by them is |√µeiγA+iδA〉 ⊗
|√µeiγB+iδB 〉. Here the global phases γA and γB cannot
be regarded as random phases because they also send the
strong reference pulses. First, we introduce the new in-
dependent variables δ± = (δB ± δA)/2. Integrating the
two-mode state of X pulses on variable δ+ over the range
of [0, 2π), we obtain a classical mixture in the convex form
∑
k
pk(µ)|ψk〉〈ψk| (5)
with |ψk〉 being the state of total photon number k for
the two-mode state |ψk〉 and pk(µ) being its probability.
For example,
|ψ0〉 = |00〉, p0(µ) = e−2µ, (6)
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(eiδB+iγB |01〉+ eiδA+iγA |10〉), (7)
with
p1(µ) = 2µe
−2µ (8)
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
ei(δA+γA+δB+γB)|11〉
+
1
2
e2i(δB+γB)|02〉+ 1
2
e2i(δA+γA)|20〉,
with
p2(µ) = 2µ
2e−2µ (9)
and so on. This means states from X-windows are actu-
ally classical mixture of different photon-numbers. The
phase randomized states from Z-windows can also be re-
garded as mixture of different photon-number states, in
particular, the ingredient of single-photons are randomly
on states |01〉 or |10〉. As shall be shown later in virtual
protocols, single-photon states of Eq.(8) can be used to
test the phase-flip rate of those single-photons from Z-
windows.
One may argue that there are afterwards announce-
ment of phase information for decoy pulses, how to guar-
antee the validity of traditional decoy-state method here,
e.g., Eq.(3). Since the phase shift information of signal
pulses are never announced, we can regard signal pulses
as classical mixture of different photon number states.
What we want to know is the number of single-photon-
caused bits and their phase-flip error rate from signal
bits. Once we know the facts, they do not change by
any action outside the lab. Consider a virtual protocol
5where Alice and Bob secretly decided the random phase
shift values prior to the protocol. In such a case, our
calculations at Step 6 above is obviously solid. Note that
the values of single-photon counts and phase-flip error
rate are objective facts which do not change by any out-
side actions. After Alice and Bob know the fact, they
can announce the phase information of all decoy pulses.
But they can also choose to first announce the phase in-
formation and then calculate the crucial values for the
signal bits, because no one knows at which time they
have done the calculation. In such a case, they do not
need to predetermine the random phase values, they just
use the protocol we proposed above. Also, there is a sim-
ilar story in the MDI-QKD: the bases information can
not be announced before the states are measured. But it
can be announced afterwards, for, the X-basis states are
only used to know the phase-flip value of those qubits in
Z basis.
Explicitly, we divide the whole space into two sub-
spaces, E for Eve and AB for Alice and Bob. After Al-
ice and Bob post announce phase shift information, they
will not receive any information from Charlie (Eve). Sup-
pose Eve has a machine M which automatically stores
all those post announced information on phase shift val-
ues of effective states in X-windows. Eve can in principle
have two different choices:
Choice 1: Ignores the machineM and does not take any
actions.
Choice 2: Makes use of the stored information ofM and
takes whatever actions she can to her probe.
Definitely, under Choice 1, all decoy-state method is
valid, all calculated values for signal states such as s1
the lower bound of single-photon counts for Z-windows
and the e¯ph1 upper bound of phase-flip rate of those single-
photon counts of Z-windows are correct and the final key
is secure. On the other hand, both Choice 1 and Choice
2 are local actions in subspace E and they do not cause
detectable effects in subspace AB. Therefore, even Eve
takes Choice 2, it makes no difference to subspace AB.
Say, no matter Eve takes which choice, there will be no
detectable difference in subspace AB. Therefore, Alice
and Bob can always assume Choice 1 for Eve. This can
be stated as the following Theorem
TheoremGiven whatever information announced by Al-
ice and Bob, Eve’s actions to her probe only cannot cause
any detectable effects in Alice and Bob’s subspace AB.
The phase-flip error is not detectable in the real pro-
tocol presented in the earlier section. But, imagine a
purification protocol where Alice and Bob use entangled
photons in Z windows and coherent states in X win-
dows only. Then the phase-flip error is detectable and the
purification result will be all the same no matter which
choice Eve has taken. Reducing this virtual protocol to
the real protocol we conclude that afterwards announce-
ment of phase shift values does not change the security.
Details of this are shown in the notes of virtual protocol
3.
V. SECURITY PROOF WITH VIRTUAL
PROTOCOLS AND REDUCTION
We first recall the Definition of time windows in send-
ing or not-sending (SNS) protocol: Any time window i,
if both Alice and Bob commit to a signal window, it is
called a Z-window; if both of them commit to a decoy
window, and if each of them have sent out to Charlie a
coherent state of the same intensity µk it is called an X-
window. Besides Z-windows and X-windows, in a com-
plete SNS protocol, there are also mismatching windows,
e.g., a time window when Alice commits to a signal win-
dow while Bob commits to a decoy window, or, when Al-
ice and Bob each commit to a decoy window but choosing
different intensities µk for the coherent state. For presen-
tation conciseness, we shall first prove the security of the
simplified form of SNS protocol which has Z-windows
and X-windows only. After the simplified SNS protocol
is proven secure, we then show that the proof also holds
for the complete SNS protocol.
A. Z-basis encoding on ancillary photons of an
extended state
If the ith time window is a Z-window, Alice and Bob
each make a decision on either sending or not-sending.If
Alice (Bob) decides sending, she (he) puts down a bit
value 1 (0) and then sends out a coherent state to Charlie;
if Alice (Bob) decides not-sending, she (he) puts down a
bit value 0 (1) and does not send out anything (i.e., sends
out a vacuum |0〉) to Charlie.
The Z-basis encoding of SNS protocol is done by deci-
sions on sending or not-sending made by Alice and Bob
locally. More precisely, the sending or not-sending de-
cision of a time window that always corresponds to the
local classical bits 0, 1 to Alice, or 1, 0 to Bob. We can
also imagine that whenever Alice (Bob) decides sending
or not-sending, she (he) always produces a local ancillary
photon-number state |0〉 or |1〉 and the corresponding bit
values are encoded in the local ancillary state. To Alice
(Bob), state |0〉 corresponds to a bit value 0 (1) and state
|1〉 corresponds to a bit value 1 (0). This is equivalent
to say that they (Alice and Bob) have used an extended
state including real-photon state which will be sent out
to Charlie and ancillary state placed locally. For exam-
ple, in a certain window when Alice decides sending and
Bob decides not sending, we can imagine that they have
actually prepared an extended state
(ρA · |0〉〈0|) | ⊗ |10〉〈10|. (10)
where ρA is the coherent state sent out by Alice in a
Z-window when she decides sending. We shall also use
notation ρB as the coherent state sent out by Bob in a
Z-window when she decides sending. As stated already,
each one’s bit value is actually encoded in the local an-
cillary photon-number state. If the ith time window is
6a Z-window, Alice and Bob each make a decision on ei-
ther sending or not-sending. We can also construct an
extended quantum state in the complex space T ⊗ An
for a Z-window as
|Ω〉 = (p1/2)(|0〉〈0| · ρB)| ⊗ (|01〉〈01|
+ (ρA · |0〉〈0)⊗ |10〉〈10|)
+ p2|00〉〈00| ⊗ |00〉〈00|
+ p3(ρA · ρB)| ⊗ |11〉〈11| (11)
The state Ω lives in a complex space of T ⊗ An. In
the right hand side of Eq.(11), those states left to the
direct product symbol ⊗, such as |0〉〈0| · ρB, ρA · |0〉〈0,
|00〉〈00|, and ρA · ρB are in the subspace T and those
states right to the direct product ⊗, such as |10〉〈10|,
|01〉〈01|, |00〉〈00|, and |11〉〈11| are in the subspace An.
For presentation simplicity, we shall name the light field
of subspace T in an extended state as real-photon state,
or real photons, and name the local light field in subspace
An as ancillary-photon state, or ancillary photons.
Ancillary state |01〉〈01| (|10〉〈10|) is for the decisions
that Alice decides not-sending (sending) and Bob decides
sending (not-sending). Ancillary-photon state |00〉〈00|
(|11〉〈11|) is for the decisions that both of them decide
not-sending (sending). In a Z-window of SNS protocol,
their action is equivalent to just sending out the real pho-
tons of Ω to Charlie and keep their ancillary photons.
Also, since ρA and ρB are phase-randomized coherent
states, each of these states can be regarded as classical
mixtures of different photon number states. Say, we can
replace ρA or ρB by
ρµ′ =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
′
µ′n
n!
|n〉〈n| = µ′e−µ′ |1〉〈1|+ (1− µ′ e−µ′)ρ¯
(12)
where
ρ¯ =
1
1− µ′e−µ′
∑
n6=1
e−µ
′
µ′n
n!
|n〉〈n| (13)
and hence we can rewrite the extended state Ω in the
following equivalent format:
Ω =
∑
r
qrΩr (14)
where r = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
Ω1 = (1/2)(|01〉〈01| ⊗ |01〉〈01|
+ |10〉〈10| ⊗ |10〉〈10|)
Ω2 = (|0〉〈0| · ρ¯)⊗ |01〉〈01|
+ (ρ¯ · |0〉〈0|)⊗ |10〉〈10|
Ω3 = |00〉〈00| ⊗ |00〉〈00|
Ω4 = ρµ′ · ρµ′ | ⊗ |11〉〈11| (15)
Also, for any time window i, if it is an X-window of
SNS protocol, they (Alice and Bob) send out two-mode
coherent state
ρX = |β˜k〉〈β˜k| (16)
where , i.e., in the form of a two-mode coherent state
|β˜k〉 = |√µkeiδA+iγA〉|
√
µ
k
eiδB+iγB 〉, (17)
and k is randomly chosen from a few different values
for different intensities µk, δA, δB are random values
taken privately by Alice and Bob, respectively, γA, γB
are global phases announced to Charlie publicly.
In the SNS protocol above, the state for a Z-window
is a classical mixture of different different kinds of time
windows. The Z-windows are classical mixture of Z1-
windows which only uses the extended states Ω1 and
other types of Z-windows which uses the extended states
of Ω2,Ω3,Ω4. (Note that all these states are orthogo-
nal.) To show the security of this protocol, we can take
the following theme: We first show the security of a pro-
tocol with only state Ω1 for a Z-window, and then extend
it to the case of state Ω for a Z-window by the tagged
model[15]: We regard the bit values of Z-basis encoding
from state Ω1 as the set of un-tagged bits and the bit
values from other states (Ω2,Ω3,Ω4) as the set of tagged
bits.
In a complete SNS protocol, besides X-windows and
Z-windows, there are other time windows (those mis-
matching windows[20]), but as shown in the end of the
proof, in that case another extended state including all
time windows is constructible and it is still a mixture of
Ω1 and other states therefore the tagged model and the
security proof here still holds. At this moment, for pre-
sentation conciseness, we consider the simplified form of
SNS protocol where there are only Z-windows and X-
windows.
B. Virtual protocol 1
Definition of effective event: We define an effective
event of a Z-window if Charlie announces one and only
one detector clicking for an individual Z-window. We
define an effective event of an X-window if Charlie
announces one and only one detector clicking for an indi-
vidual X-window and values δA, δB in the corresponding
state satisfies Eq.(24). They will then only use states or
data corresponding to effective events in the protocol. A
time window that presents an effective event is named as
an effective time window. An effective ancillary photon is
an ancillary photon corresponding to an effective event.
Preparation stage
They pre-share classical information for different time
windows they will use, X-windows and Z-windows. They
also pre-share an extended state
Ω0i = |Ψ1i〉〈Ψ1i|
|Ψ1i〉 = eiγBi |01〉 ⊗ |01〉+ eiγAi |10〉 ⊗ |10〉 (18)
for the ith time window. Here values of γAi , γBi are an-
nounced publicly.
For any time window i, if it is an X-window, Alice
takes a local random phase shift δAi and Bob takes a
7local random phase shift δBi locally to the real-photon
of state Ω0i. We name the state after the random phase
shifts as ΩXi. Explicitly
ΩXi = |Ψ′1i〉〈Ψ′1i|
|Ψ′1i〉 = eiδBi+iγBi |01〉 ⊗ |01〉+ eiδAi+iγAi |10〉 ⊗ |10〉
(19)
with the random values δAi, δBi being privately chosen
by Alice and Bob, respectively.
For any time window i, if it is an Z-window, through
discussions by a secret channel, Alice takes a local re-
stricted random phase shift δAi and Bob takes a local
restricted random phase shift δBi to the real-photon of
state Ω0i, with the restriction
1− | cos(δBi − δAi)| ≤ |λ| (20)
We name the state after the restricted random phase
shifts as ΩZi, which has the form
ΩZi = |Ψ′1〉〈Ψ′1i|
|Ψ′1i〉 = eiδBi+iγBi |01〉 ⊗ |01〉+ eiδAi+iγAi |10〉 ⊗ |10〉
(21)
which ΩXi, but with an additional restriction of Eq.(20).
The constraint Eq.(20) makes the state in Z-windows
not identical to that in all X-windows. If we define an
X˜-window as a time window whose parameters δAi , δBi
in extended state ΩXi satisfying Eq.(20), the extended
state for Z-windows is identical to the extended state of
X˜-windows.
For presentation simplicity, we shall omit the sub-
scripts i in all phase values δAi , δBi , γAi , γBi and states.
Also, we introduce states |χ0〉, |χ1〉 in the real-photon
space for any time window
|χ0〉 = 1√
2
(eiδB+iγB |01〉+ eiδA+iγA |10〉)
|χ1〉 = 1√
2
(eiδB+iγB |01〉 − eiδA+iγA |10〉)
if cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0 (22)
and
|χ0〉 = 1√
2
(eiδB+iγB |01〉 − eiδA+iγA |10〉)
|χ1〉 = 1√
2
(eiδB+iγB |01〉+ eiδA+iγA |10〉)
if cos(δB − δA) < 0. (23)
Virtual Protocol 1
1-1 At any time window i, if it is a Z-window (X-
window), they send out to Charlie the real-photon state
from state ΩZ (ΩX) as defined by Eq.(21) (Eq.(19))to
Charlie and keep the ancillary photons locally.
1-2 Charlie announces his measurement outcome of all
time windows. They tell each other δA, δB values through
classical communication and then take post selection to
all X-windows and the one-detector-clicking events from
the X-windows by the following criterion
1− | cos(δB − δA)| ≤ |λ| (24)
which is identical to Eq.(20). Taking post selection by
this criterion, they obtain X˜-windows and effective events
of X-windows which can be regarded as effective events
of X˜-windows. According to our definition, an X˜-window
satisfies Eq.(20) therefore identical to a Z-window.
Definition: After the post selection taken in step 1-2,
they divide their effective time windows and correspond-
ing effective ancillary photons into 4 subsets according to
the clicking detector (the left or the right) and the sign
of cos(δB − δA) (positive or negative). Each subset of
time windows is labeled by ξ = (a, d) where a = +,−
and d = L,R.
Explicitly, time window ξ = (a, d) is an effective time
window heralded by joint events of a and d as defined in
the following:
Event a: the sign of cos(δB−δA) is a (+ or −). Explicitly,
a = + for cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0, a = − for cos(δB − δA) < 0.
Event d: Detector d has clicked and the other detector
has not clicked. d can be either L for the left detector or
R for the right detector.
Definitions We shall use notation Zξ (Xξ) for a Z-window
(X-window) with joint events of a, d for ξ = (a, d). We
shall also use set AZξ (AXξ ) for the set of effective ancil-
lary photons of time windows Zξ (Xξ).
1-3 They check the phase-flip error rate Eξ for set of
AXξ , where ξ = (+, L), (−, L), (+, R), (−, R), which is
also the estimated phase-flip error rates of set AZξ and
ξ = (+, L), (−, L), (+, R), (−, R).
1-4 They purify the ancillary photons of time windows
Zξ and ξ = (+, L), (−, L), (+, R), (−, R) separately. Af-
ter purification, they obtain high quality single-photon
states |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉 with (almost) 100% purity. They each
measures the photon number locally to the purified pho-
tons and obtain the final key kf . Alice puts down a bit
value 0 or 1 whenever she obtains a measurement out-
come of vacuum or 1 photon, Bob puts down a bit value
1 or 0 whenever she obtains a measurement outcome of
vacuum or 1 photon.
Note 1 Security . The security of the final key is based
on the faithfulness of the purification, i.e., the estimation
of phase-flip error rate. Charlie has determined effective
ancillary photons but Alice and Bob test the phase-flip
error rate themselves in step 1-3. Although the extended
state of an X-window is not identical to that of a Z-
window, the extended state of an X˜-window is identical
to that of a Z-window. After the post-selection condition
in step 1-2, it is equivalent to say that all effective events
of X-windows are just effective events from X˜ windows.
Therefore, an ancillary photon from set AXξ is identical
to an ancillary photon from set AZξ . So, statistically, the
phase-flip-error rate value of set AXξ is exactly the value
of set AZξ .
8Note 2 Definitions of phase-flip-error rate.
Suppose set AXξ contains nξ effective ancillary pho-
tons. If each photons of set AXξ were measured in basis
{|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉} and there were n(0)ξ outcome of |Φ0〉〈Φ0|, and
n
(1)
ξ outcome of |Φ1〉〈Φ1|, the phase-flip error rate for setAXξ is
Eξ =
min
(
n
(0)
ξ , n
(1)
ξ
)
nξ
. (25)
Changing the values of n
(0)
ξ , n
(1)
ξ , nξ into the correspond-
ing values of set AZξ in Eq.(25), we can define the phase
flip error rate for set AZξ . Statistically, Eξ for set AXξ is
also the asymptotic phase-flip error rate of set AZξ . To
know the values Eξ, they can choose to measure each pho-
tons of set AXξ in basis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉}. But instead of this,
they can also choose to take local measurements in basis
{|x±〉} in each sides and check the parity of each mea-
surement outcome. (Outcome of |x+〉|x+〉 or |x−〉|x−〉)
are even-parity while |x+〉|x−〉 or |x−〉|x+〉 are odd par-
ity.) Note that all effective ancillary photons are single-
photons. As it is easy to see , for single-photons, the
fraction of odd parity (even parity) outcome from mea-
surement of each sides in basis {|x±〉} is exactly equal
to the fraction of |Φ1〉〈Φ1| (|Φ0〉〈Φ0|) outcome from the
measurement in basis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉}. Moreover, this mea-
surement step is only needed here for this Virtual pro-
tocol, it is not needed for a real protocol. For ease of
presentation, we suppose they use the measurement ba-
sis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉}.
Note 3 Reduction of pre-shared states for X-windows
Reduction 1 It makes no difference to anyone outside if
they measure all ancillary photons of X-windows in basis
{|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉} before the protocol starts. This measure-
ment operation is on ancillary photon while the initial
random phase shift operation (δA, δB) are on the real-
photon space, so these two operation commute. We as-
sume they first take measurement to ancillary photons
and then take local random phase shifts to the real-
photon state for an X-window. They start from the
pre-shared pair of Eq.(18). After measurement to the
ancillary photon, they obtain one of the following out-
come extended state for an X-window, depending on the
measurement outcome of ancillary photon:
either
|W˜0〉 ⊗ |Φ0〉
|W˜0〉 = 1√
2
(eiγB |01〉+ eiγA |10〉) (26)
or
|W˜1〉 ⊗ |Φ1〉
|W˜1〉 = 1√
2
(eiγB |01〉 − eiγA |10〉) (27)
They then take local phase shifts δA, δB to real-photon
state of outcome extended state, which is one of the above
two states. If They then take all steps in Virtual 1 from
step 1-1 to step 1-4 as if they were using the original
pre-shared extended states without measurement to the
ancillary photons at this stage. The result should be
equivalent to the original Virtual protocol.
Reduction 2 Alternatively, they can just start with states
of Eq.(26,27) for their X-windows. They need pre-
share classical information on Z-windows, X0-windows,
and X1-windows. They pre-share real-photon states
|W˜0〉 = 1√2 (eiγB |01〉 + eiγA |10〉) for X0-windows and
|W˜1〉 = 1√2 (eiγB |01〉−eiγA |10〉) for X1-windows. Imagine
that they also pre-share some single-photon states |Φ0〉
and |Φ1〉. (These states |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 are not really nec-
essary, to show everything clearly we assume so at this
moment.)
In an X0-window, they take local private random phase-
shift δA, δB on the pre-shared state |W˜0〉, changing it to
|W0〉 = 1√
2
(eiδB+iγB |01〉+ eiδA+iγA |10〉). (28)
They label a pre-shared state |Φ0〉 as the ancillary pho-
ton for this state |W0〉 above. They then send the real-
photon state |W0〉 out to Charlie. After step 1-2, they
have known the values of δA, δB, and they now know the
original extended state with the labeled ancillary photon
Ω+,0 = |χ0〉〈χ0| ⊗ |Φ0〉〈Φ0| if cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0 (29)
Ω−,0 = |χ1〉〈χ1| ⊗ |Φ0〉〈Φ0| if cos(δB − δA) < 0 (30)
Here we have used the same definition for |χ0〉, |χ1〉 as
used in Eq.(22,23).
In an X1-window, they take the same operations above
to state |W˜1〉, changing it to
|W1〉 = 1√
2
(eiδB+iγB |01〉 − eiδA+iγA |10〉). (31)
They label a pre-shared state |Φ1〉 as the ancillary photon
for this state |W1〉 above. They then send the real-photon
state |W1〉 out to Charlie. After step 1-2, they will know
the values of δA, δB, and they now know the original ex-
tended state with the labeled ancillary photon is
Ω+,1 = |χ1〉〈χ1| ⊗ |Φ1〉〈Φ1| if cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0 (32)
Ω−,1 = |χ0〉〈χ0| ⊗ |Φ1〉〈Φ1| if cos(δB − δA) < 0 (33)
Here we have used the same definition for |χ0〉, |χ1〉 as
used in Eq.(22,23).
Given the orthogonal extended states by
Eqs(29,30,32,33), we can define 4 subsets of time
windows by X(a,b), where a = +,− and b = 0, 1. An
X(a,b)-window is an effective time window heralded by
joint events a and b defined in the following:
Event a: the sign of cos(δB − δA) is a;
9Event b: the ancillary state is |Φb〉. Specifically,
X(a,b) − window :
a = + for cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0
a = − for cos(δB − δA) < 0
b = 0 for ancillary state |Φ0〉〈Φ0|
b = 1 for ancillary state |Φ1〉〈Φ1|. (34)
On the other hand, after step 1-2, they can judge explic-
itly the values a and b if it is an effective window. Value
b is determined by the pre-shared information, b = 0 for
an X0-window and b = 1 for an X1-window. Value a is
determined by the random phase shift values of δA, δB
chosen for the time window, a = + if cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0,
a = − if cos(δB − δA) < 0.
Given anX0-window or an X1-window, the measurement
outcome in basis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉} in step 1-3 is actually de-
terministic and hence the measurement in step 1-3 is not
necessary. Therefore, according to our Definition 1, they
can use the following operable definition to calculate each
quantities in Eq.(25) after step 1-2. We introduceX(a,b,d)
for an effective time window with joint events a, b, and
d, as defined in the following:
Event a: The sign of cos(δA − δB);
Event b: The time window is Xb-window;
Event d: Detector d has clicked and the other detector
has not clicked, d = L for left detector and d = R for the
right detector.
For example an X(+,1,L)-window is a time window satis-
fying the following conditions:
1, At this window, cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0
2, It is an X1-window, i.e. the the ancillary photon state
is |Φ1〉〈Φ1|
3, The left detector clicks and the right detector does not
click.
We also introduce notation NX(a,b,d) for the number of
X(a,b,d)-windows in the protocol. Therefore we have
n
(0)
(a,d) = NX(a,0,d) (35)
n
(1)
(a,d) = NX(a,1,d) (36)
for Eq.(25). Given Eq(35,36), we can apply Eq.(25) im-
mediately after step 1-2, i.e., we have removed the mea-
surement operation in step 1-3.
Importantly, all values of a, b, c can be determined from
the values of δA, δB, the pre-shared information for time
window X0 or X1, and Charlie’s announcement on the
clicking detector, L or R. The ancillary photons for X-
windows are actually not needed in the protocol.
C. Virtual protocol 2
Here we assume they pre-share a classical information
for windows of Z, X0, and X1. They pre-share the
same extended states ΩZ for Z-windows as in Virtual
protocol 1. They initially pre-share real-photon states
|W˜0〉 = 1√2 (eiγB |01〉 + eiγA |10〉) for X0-windows and
|W˜1〉 = 1√2 (eiγB |01〉 − eiγA |10〉) for X1-windows. They
take local random phase-shifts δA, δB on a state |W˜0〉
for an X0-window, on state |W˜1〉 for an X1-window.
After local phase-shifts, they share a state |W0〉 =
1√
2
(eiδB+iγB |01〉 + eiδA+iγA |10〉) for an X0-window and
a state |W1〉 = 1√2 (eiδB+iγB |01〉 − eiδA+iγA |10〉) for an
X1-window.
Virtual Protocol 2
2-1 At any time window i, if it is a Z-window, they send
out to Charlie the real-photon from state ΩZ to Charlie
and keep the ancillary photon locally. If it is an X0-
window (X1-window), they send out to Charlie the real-
photon state |W0〉 (|W1〉).
2-2 Charlie announces his measurement outcome of all
time windows. They tell each other δA, δB values through
classical communication and then take post selection for
X-windows by criterion of Eq.(24).
2-3 They estimate the phase-flip error rate Eξ for sets of
AZξ , where ξ = (+, L), (−, L), (+, R), (−, R) by formula
E(a,d) =
min(NX(a,0,d) , NX(a,1,d))
n(a,d)
(37)
where d = L,R.
2-4 They purify the effective ancillary photons in sets
AZξ and ξ = (+, L), (−, L), (+, R), (−, R) separately. Af-
ter purification, they obtain a number of final states all
in |Φ0〉 from sets (+, L), (−, R), and all in |Φ1〉 from sets
(−, L), (+, R). They each measures the photon-number
locally to each purified single-photons and obtain the fi-
nal key kf .
Note 1 The X1-window is not needed. It is easy to show,
the density operator ρ0 for a time window X0 is actually
identical to the density operator ρ1 for a time window
X1. Also, it is easy to see
ρ+,0 = ρ−,1, ρ−,0 = ρ+,1 (38)
where ρa,b is the density operator for time windows of
X(a,b), taken average on all allowed values of δA, δB. This
means we have
NX(a,1,d) = NX(a¯,0,d) (39)
therefore we can simply replace NX(a,1,d) in the phase-
flip error rate formula Eq.(37) by NX(a¯,0,d) . Also since
ρ0 = ρ1, Eve can find no difference if we replace all
X1-windows by X0-windows. Therefore, we don’t need
X1-windows, consequently, they only need a classical
information for Z-windows and X-windows (i.e., X0-
windows), and they only need an initial state |W˜0〉 for
X-windows. In this way, an X-window is just an X0-
window. Consider NXa,1,d in Eq.(37). It can be replaced
by NXa¯,0,d because of Eq.(39). Further, since there is no
X1-window now, X0-window is just X-window, NXa,1,d
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can be further replaced byNX(a¯,d) and Eq.(37) is replaced
by
E(a,d) =
min(NX(a,d) , NX(a¯,d))
n(a,d)
(40)
Note 2 They don’t need to pre-share any state for X-
windows. As was shown by Eq.(5) already, the two-mode
coherent state can be regarded as a mixture of different
two-mode photon number state. The single-photon state
there in Eq.(7) is equivalent to the pre-shared state of
|W0〉.
Note 3 Purifying all effective ancillary photon in one
batch. Definitely, they can choose to purify all effective
ancillary photons of Z-windows in one batch. The phase-
flip error rate is
Eph =
∑
a,dmin(NX(a,d) , NX(a¯,d))
n1
(41)
=
2
∑
dmin(NX(+,d) , NX(−,d))
NX(+,L) +NX(−,L) +NX(+,R) +NX(−,R)
(42)
where n1 = NX(+,L) + NX(−,L) + NX(+,R) + NX(−,R)
is the total number of effective X-windows. Surely,
NX(−,L) ≥ min(NX(+,L) , NX(−,L)) and NX(+,R) ≥
min(NX(+,R) , NX(−,R)). Therefore the phase-flip error
rate formula of Eq.(41) can be simplified into
Eph ≤ NX(−,L) +NX(+,R)
n1
(43)
which is simply to count the following two types of joint
events as phase-flip errors:
1, Left-detector-clicking only and cos(δB − δA) < 0
2, Right-detector-clicking only and cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0.
If they use this formula, Charlie can make a high quality
raw state of effective ancillary photons for Alice and Bob
by setting his measurement set-up properly so that with
very small probability for the left-detector-clicking (right-
detector-clicking) due to the incident state of |χ1〉 (|χ0〉).
D. Virtual protocol 3
3-1 They send out the real photons of state ΩZ in Eq.(18)
for a Z-window and state ρX as defined in Eq.(16) in an
X-window.
3-2, Charlie announces his measurement outcome. They
each announce the random phase shift values δA, δB and
take post selection for X-windows by Eq.(24).
3-3 They verify the phase-flip error rate eph1 for effective
ancillary photons with classical data of X-windows an-
nounced by Charlie through decoy-state analysis. In an
X-window, an error is counted if the cos(δB − δA) ≥ 0
and right detector clicks, or cos(δB−δA) < 0 and the left
detector clicks.
3-4 They take purification and local measurement on pu-
rified single-photons to obtain the final key.
Note 1 eph1 , E
ph, and validity of the decoy-state method
The physical meaning of eph1 is same with that of E
ph
that appeared in Virtual protocol 2, just the phase-flip
error rate of effective ancillary photons of Z-windows.
But there, the value Eph is directly observed, here the
value eph1 is calculated by the decoy-state method.
We use notation I for the information of random phase-
shift values δA, δB of state ρX post announced in step 3-2.
According to our Theorem, Eve’s action with informa-
tion I does not cause any detectable effects for any set
of ancillary photons. Therefore, any physically testable
conclusion on the ancillary photons, if it is correct in the
case that Eve ignores information I, it must be also cor-
rect in the case that Eve uses I. Here the decoy-state
analysis is to conclude the upper bound value of phase-
flip error rate of the effective ancillary photons. The
conclusion is physically testable because the phase-flip
error rate for the ancillary photons here is physically de-
tectable. Definitely, the conclusion form the decoy-state
method for the upper bound is correct if Eve ignores in-
formation I. According to our Theorem in Section IV
the upper-bound conclusion must be also correct in the
case that Eve uses I.
Note 2: Probabilistic mixture of different photon-number
states and the decoy-state analysis
Consider Eqs(5,7). We can regard the X-windows as
classical mixture of X1-window and other types of X-
windows, and an X1-window is defined as an X-window
when a two-mode single-photon is sent out to Charlie by
Alice and Bob. We need the yield value of s1, which
is just the effective-event rate of all X1-windows. Say,
k1 effective events are produced from K1 X1-windows
in the whole protocol, then s1 = k1/K1. This can be
worked out by decoy-state analysis, e.g., given 3 inten-
sities µ0 = 0, µ1, µ2 and µ0 = 0 < µ1 < µ2, through
directly applying Eq.(17) of Ref[16] we have:
s1 ≥ s1 =
p2(µ2)(Sµ1 − p0(µ1)s0)− p2(µ1)(Sµ2 − p0(µ2)s0)
p2(µ2)p1(µ1)− p2(µ1)p1(µ2) (44)
where pk(µ) is defined by Eqs.(6,8,9) and s0, Sµ1 , Sµ2
are experimentally observed effective-event rate of Xµ0-
windows, Xµ1 -windows, Xµ2 -windows, and µ0 = 0. We
also have the following formula for the upper bound value
of phase-flip error rate of effective ancillary photons of Z-
windows
eph1 ≤ e¯ph1 =
Sµ1E
X
µ1
− e−2µ1s0/2
2µ1e−2µ1s1
. (45)
If we use infinite intensities, we can even verify the exact
value of s1, as was applied in our numerical simulation
and other works on TF-QKD.
Note 3 quasi-purification
Since their goal is to have the final key only, a true purifi-
cation to ancillary photons is not necessary[19]. They can
choose to measure all ancillary photons of Z-windows in
advance[19] in photon-number basis and then take virtual
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purification to classical data of Z-windows correspond-
ing to those effective events. They then take a virtual
quasi-purification to the classical data, which is just the
final key distillation. Also, the pre-shared extended state
for a Z-window is just (|01〉〈01| ⊗ |01〉〈01| + |10〉〈10| ⊗
|10〉〈10|)/2. The pre-arranged restriction of local phase-
shifts by Eq.(20) is now trivial and ignored in Z-windows.
E. Protocol 4 and complete SNS protocol
Protocol 4 is exactly equivalent to the simplified SNS
protocol, they need an extended state Ω as Eq.(14) for
a Z-window and pre-share a classical information for Z-
windows and X-windows.
4-1 They send out to Charlie the real photons of state Ω
in a Z-window and two-mode coherent state ρX as de-
fined in Eq.(16) in an X-window.
4-2 They take post selection for X-windows by the crite-
rion of Eq.(24).
4-3 They verify the phase-flip error rate eph1 by the decoy-
state analysis. Also, they verify n1, the number of un-
tagged bits in Z-basis by decoy-state analysis.
4-4 They each observe the ancillary state for bit value of
an effective event in a Z-window. They take error test
for Z-basis encoding by classical communication.
4-5 After virtual purification to the classical data (final
key distillation), they obtain the final key with the length
given by Eq.(46).
Note 1 In this protocol, the state Ω of Eq.(14) for Z-
basis is a classical mixture of state Ω1 of Eq.(15) and
other states. Given the notes under Virtual protocol 3,
if they have only used state Ω1 for Z-windows in Virtual
protocol 4, it is equivalent to Virtual protocol 3 which has
been shown to be secure already. We can now apply the
tagged model[15]. Consider Z-windows. Some of the Z-
windows use the extended states of Ω1, we name these Z-
windows as Z1-windows. Suppose there are n1 bits from
Z1-windows. These n1 bits from Z1-bits are regarded as
the un-tagged bits. All the other bits corresponding are
regarded as tagged bits. Applying the tagged model, they
can distill a secure final key from all bits with length
nF = n1 − n1H(eph1 )− ntH(EZ) (46)
where nt is the number of total raw bits corresponding
to effective events and EZ is the bit error rate in Z-basis.
An error bit in Z-basis is defined as the case that Alice’s
bit value is different from Bob’s bit value in an effective
Z-window. In the formula above, values of n1, e
ph
1 can
be computed by the decoy-state method, while nt, EZ
are directly observed by test.
Note 2 Equivalence to the real SNS protocol. Suppose
in the Virtual protocol 4 above, the pre-shared classi-
cal information takes probability pZ for a Z-window,
probability pµk for an X-window using intensity µk, and
pZ +
∑
k pµk = 1. In our real protocol, they each take
probability qz for a signal window and qµk for a decoy
window with intensity µk. In this way, the real pro-
tocol has a probability q2Z for a Z-window, q
2
µk
for an
Xµk -window. Discarding events of all those mismatch-
ing windows, the real protocol is equivalent to Virtual
protocol 4 above with setting of
pZ = q
2
Z/N , pµk = q2µk/N (47)
N = q2Z +
∑
k
q2µk . (48)
But the security of Virtual protocol 4 has already been
proven. On the other hand, we can also construct an-
other Virtual protocol including events of mismatching
windows in the real protocol. Suppose in the real pro-
tocol, the real-photon state sent-out for a mismatching
window is ρM.
Virtual protocol 5
They pre-share classical information on time windows of
Z, {Xµk}, and mismatching windowsM, assigning prob-
abilities of pZ , {pµk}, and pM for each of them. They also
pre-arrange the different window commitment of Alice
and Bob for the mismatching windows, i.e. make sure
they have committed differently for all pre-agreed mis-
matching windows.
5-1 They send out the real photons of state Ω of Eq.(14)
in a Z-window, the two-mode coherent state ρX as de-
fined in Eq.(16) in an X-window, and state ρM in an
mismatching window.
5-2 They each announce the specific type of window com-
mitted and discard those mismatching windows. They
take post selection for X-windows by Eq.(24).
5-3, 5-4 are identical to virtual protocol 4.
Note 1. The first half of 5-2 is not necessary in proto-
col 5 itself, but we arrange it in order to show that the
real protocol is strictly equivalent to Virtual protocol 5.
Explicitly, if we set
pZ = q
2
Z , pµk = q
2
µk
, pM = 1− pZ −
∑
k
q2µk , (49)
in protocol 5, the real protocol is strictly equivalent to
it. This completes the security of SNS protocol.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARK
In conclusion, following the novel idea of TF-QKD[14],
we proposed the sending or not-sending TF-QKD proto-
col. Our protocol does not need to announce the phase
information of signal pulses and hence the traditional
decoy-state formulas can be directly applied. The single-
photon interference is not needed in Z basis thus the
error rate in Z basis can be negligibly small. This makes
the protocol be tolerable to a fairly large error rate in
X basis where single photon interference must be done.
Numerical simulation shows that the protocol can ex-
ceed a secure distance of 800 km without misalignment
error, and more than 700 km with a misalignment er-
ror of 15%. Even though the misalignment error for the
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FIG. 3: Schematic picture of TF-QKD taken from [14].
single-photon interference is as large as 25%, the proto-
col can still reach a secure distance of more than 600 km.
Thanks to the revolutionary progress made by TF-QKD
proposed in [14].
Appendix: Eavesdropping scheme based on
afterwards announced phase information of signal
states.
Earlier, we showed that our protocol can apply the tra-
ditional decoy-state method directly because the phase
information of signal states is never announced. But, if it
were announced and it took a role in bit value, then there
were Eavesdropping schemes effectively attacking the se-
cret bits. Here we show this by a specific scheme. Con-
sider the original TF-QKD protocol[14] as shown in Fig.3.
Suppose coherent state of intensity µ is used by each sides
for signal pulses. The pulse pairs are phase modulated
before being sent out for Charlie. The phase modulation
includes the coding phase (0 or π) at each sides and the
random phase shift we assume to be ρ at both sides[14].
After modulation, the states of signal pulse pairs are
two-mode coherent states |ψ+〉 = |√µeiρ〉| − √µeiρ〉
for bit value 0 and |ψ−〉 = | − √µeiρ〉|√µeiρ〉 for bit
value 1, which will cause clicking of detector D0 only;
and also |φ+〉 = |√µeiρ〉|√µeiρ〉 for bit value 0 and
|φ−〉 = | − √µeiρ〉| − √µeiρ〉 for bit value 1, which
will cause the clicking of detector D1 only. Note that
the strong reference light is controlled by Eve, here we
have assumed the reference phase to be 0 for conciseness.
Eve applies the following scheme: Step 0. Eve can set
whatever channel transmittance. For simplicity, we as-
sume Eve sets the channel transmittance to be 1 here.
Consider Fig.1. Before the twin pulses enter the beam
splitter, Eve.(Charlie) just honestly does whatever as re-
quested by the the TF-QKD protocol. Step 1 Eve. takes
non-destructive crude measurement to project the output
light from the beam splitter to vacuum or non vacuum
subspace. Suppose she obtains non-vacuum, she stores
the detected state and continue the attacking scheme.
Step 2 Eve takes a crude measurement to project the
stored state either to the subspace S = {|1〉, |2〉} or to the
subspace S˜ = {|3〉, |4〉, |5〉, · · · }. Suppose the outcome is
S, she stores the state and continues. Step 3 Eve. takes
the following unitary transformation to her stored state
above: |1〉 → √µ|1〉+√1− µ|m0〉, |2〉 → |2〉 where |m0〉
is a state orthogonal to both |1〉 and |2〉. Eve. takes a
crude measurement which collapses the stored state in
Step 3 either to state |m0〉 or the subspace S spanned by
the Fock states {|1〉, |2〉}. Suppose she obtains subspace
S in step 3, she stores the state and announces which
detector (D0 or D1) has counted. She wait until Alice
and Bob’s announcement, then goto Step 5.
Note: until now we always assume Eve obtains the re-
sults in favor of her attacking in those non-trace preserv-
ing maps. The point is that, at any step, if Eve doesn’t
obtain the measurement outcome in favor of her, she just
announces that she has not detected anything.
Step 5 After Alice and Bob announce the value of
ρ, bases of each pulse pairs, and which pulses are decoy
pulses and which pulses are signal pulses, Eve. can takes
a phase shift operation to her stored state, changing it
into one of the following 2 states corresponding on bit
value 0 or 1 of the incident pulse pair: 1√
2
(|1〉 ± |2〉).
This enables Eve. to know the bit value for sure without
causing any noise by a projective measurement.
Here are details of the state evolution for the non-
trace-preserving map above. Suppose at Step 1 detec-
tor D0 counts only, the incident state can be either
|ψ+〉 or |ψ−〉. If the incident state is |ψ+〉, the stored
states {|ψ+i 〉} at the end of each Steps {i} are: |ψ+1 〉 =
N1
∑∞
k=1
(
√
2µeiρ)k√
k!
|k〉;, |ψ+2 〉 = N2(
√
µ|1〉 + µeiρ|2〉);,
|ψ+4 〉 = 1√2 (|1〉 + eiρ|2〉). |ψ
+
5 〉 = 1√2 (|1〉 + |2〉). All pa-
rameters N1,N2,N4 are normalization factors.
Similarly, given the incident states {|ψ−〉}, we can also
calculate time evolution of {|ψ−}〉 at each Steps {i}, and
we obtain: |ψ−5 〉 = 1√2 (−|1〉+ |2〉). This means |ψ
+
5 〉 and
|ψ−5 〉 are orthogonal to each either and Eve can know the
corresponding bit value for sure. In the same way, one
can easily show that Eve can also obtain full information
of bit values without causing disturbance.
In the Eavesdropping above, the fraction of bits caused
by single-photon state is 50% among all raw bits. Accord-
ing to the key rate formula (Eq.(2)) of Ref.[14], TF-QKD
will present a key rate of 50% from raw key to final key
although the actual key rate is obviously 0. This means
the key rate formula does not match the protocol itself
there. The root of the problem is that Eve can make
use of post announced phase information of signal states
there. Given that protocol, one have to apply a different
key rate formula.
Note added: After we announced our Eavesdropping
scheme on the arXiv:1805.02272, it was then suggested
using different key rate formulas directly pointing to non-
random-phase coherent states [17, 18].
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